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Abstract 
This article evaluates two theoretical approaches to the popularity and resilience of 
authoritarianism in Russia, namely political culture and social contract theory. These 
approaches are two of the most important theories of Russian politics and also reflect the 
general divide in comparative and post-communist politics between political-cultural and 
rationalist explanations. We demonstrate that these approaches are bound up with different 
notions of legitimacy. This article suggests that neither framework offers a complete 
explanation of the Russian case. We develop an alternative framework that bridges these two 
approaches. Our analysis suggests that the social contract in Russia needs to be analysed as 
dynamic and conditional. Moreover, the use of different legitimation strategies by Russian 
authorities suggests that leaders can reshape the social contract and gain support in a strategic 
fashion by choosing appeals related to political culture. 
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What accounts for the stability and popularity of the Putin regime in Russia? Given the 
authoritarian turn during the Putin era, this question has already attracted attention in popular 
as well as scholarly debates in Russia and in the West. As scholars stressing the strength of 
the Middle Eastern regimes prior to the Arab Spring or of the communist countries in the 
early 1980s have realised, it is easy to overstate authoritarian stability and popularity, not 
least given electoral manipulation as well as restrictions on the media (Schedler 2002). While 
this makes it difficult to assess just how large the support for the Putin regime is - and how 
easily it might unravel in the face of freer media and honest and competitive election 
campaigns, there is considerable evidence to suggest high support for the government and the 
president in particular (Frye et al. 2016). 
Given the robust democratic awakening in the late 1980s/early 1990s, many observers 
predicted that Russia would develop into a Western-style democracy. Therefore, the 
popularity of the authoritarian turn under Putin is puzzling. It seems clear that Russia's 
political system offers limited scope for popular input, as elections are not free and fair and 
competition in the political realm is limited. This has even led some analysts to speak of a 
‘Sovietization of Russian politics’ (Kryshtanovskaya and White 2005) 
This article evaluates two theoretical approaches to the resilience of authoritarianism 
in Russia, namely political culture and social contract theory. These are two of the most 
influential approaches to Russian politics and reflect the divide in comparative and post-
communist politics between political-cultural and rationalist explanations (Whitefield and 
Evans 1999; Eckstein 1988).  As both theories are quite abstract and hard to test, we seek to 
operationalise them by demonstrating how they are bound up with different notions of 
legitimacy (for a summary, see Table 1). This is an important concept for understanding 
political stability in Russia (Sil and Chen 2004). The starting point of the concept of 
legitimacy is the justification of power through the pursuit of the common good of society. 
This distinguishes the legitimate exercise of power from merely effective exercise of power. 
In other words, legitimacy is a form of generalised support and trust in existing political 
institutions that does not exclusively depend on personal advantage or securing specific 
gains. It is based on values that benefit the community as a whole both in a material and 
ethical sense.  
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The political culture approach is bound up with traditional and charismatic forms of 
authority and legitimacy that are often seen to be rooted in Russian history and culture (Pipes 
2004; Hedlund 2005). This approach implies that Russian support for authoritarianism might 
be quite stable and even unconditional, as the prevailing political culture predisposes people 
towards favouring strong authoritarian leadership and against democratic governance. From 
this perspective, neither the democratic reversal nor the popularity of authoritarianism is 
surprising.  
The second approach, based on social contract theory, has been advanced by some 
Russian scholars (Auzan 2009; Makarkin 2011) and implies that Russians are less uncritical 
in their assessment of Putin's rule than some Western observers suggest. Russian support for 
the Putin regime amounts to a form of “conditional tolerance” (Pakulski 1986) - i.e., Russians 
are willing to give up free elections (and renounce on demands for “input legitimacy”) if the 
regime delivers its part of the bargain in terms of good economic outcomes (i.e., “output 
legitimacy” is satisfied).   
This article suggests that both explanations are incomplete. The first explanation, 
emphasising political culture, overstates the depth of support for the Putin regime.1 Given 
that cultural factors are relatively durable and change only slowly, this explanation struggles 
to address why support for democracy has varied over time - notably, why it was quite high 
in the early 1990s and why there have been some fluctuations in the support for key 
democratic processes, such as the direct election of governors (Makarkin 2011, 1468). In 
other words, this would confirm that Russians are not inherently undemocratic, as also shown 
by Colton and McFaul (2002). While there is some evidence in support of the social contract 
explanation, i.e. the idea that the support for the authoritarian turn is contextual (initially 
prompted by the perception of chaos in the 1990s) and fuelled by the perception of good 
regime performance in terms of economic growth, it is relatively hard to distinguish between 
the political culture and social contract approaches in the period 1999-2007. Both approaches 
predict high support for the regime at that time, but during the economic crisis the predictions 
of the two approaches diverge. We show that the social contract approach cannot fully 
explain the support for the political regime during the global economic crisis when economic 
performance deteriorated.  
 We develop an alternative framework that bridges these approaches and extends them 
in important ways. First, as both research on the Soviet Union and on contemporary Russia 
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has shown that the stability of social contracts cannot be taken for granted, we suggest that 
social contracts must be understood in dynamic terms and that we need to focus on the ways 
in which social contracts are maintained and renegotiated over time. Second, we integrate 
insights from scholarship on political culture to suggest that culture should not be understood 
as a rigid structural constraint, but that it can also serve as a resource which political leaders 
can draw on for political legitimation strategies. As Swidler (1986) has shown, culture can be 
understood as a toolkit or repertoire of symbols, stories and worldviews that actors can use to 
construct strategies of action. We argue that support for the Putin regime can be understood 
as a social contract, but that the regime has been able to redefine the terms of the contract, 
notably during the economic crisis, when oil prices and economic growth have fallen. By 
raising the salience of national security and nationalism as key performance indicators, 
assessments of the regime in terms of performance have remained favourable. The 
significance of these appeals resonates with a political cultural approach. 
 The article is structured in the following way. The next section outlines the 
approaches to authoritarian stability in Russia based on political culture and social contract 
theory. It shows how these approaches imply different forms of political legitimacy, and it 
discusses the alternative framework proposed in this article, which builds on these 
approaches. The following sections evaluate these approaches by examining empirical data.  
As we were not able to run our own survey to test these hypotheses, we use descriptive 
statistics from survey data to illustrate relevant developments in state-society relations in 
Russia. The final section concludes with some general lessons from this analysis about the 
stability of the Putin regime and authoritarian resilience more generally.   
Political Culture and Social Contract Theory  
Political culture has long been an important approach to political science and political 
sociology, though its influence on academic debates has fluctuated. Sidney Verba, an 
influential contributor to the literature on political culture, has stated that "The political 
culture of a society consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values 
which defines the situation in which political action takes place. It provides the subjective 
orientation to politics." (Verba 1965, 513). In Lucian Pye’s definition political culture 
"encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity.... [It] is thus the 
manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics” 
(Pye 1968, 218). There are different ways of studying political culture (Wilson 2000), but all 
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of them analyse the ways in which beliefs and understandings of politics vary across 
countries and shape political systems and behaviour.  
The concept of political culture has been influential in scholarship on Russia (Brown 
1985; Whitefield 2005). For example, Richard Pipes develops an argument about Russian 
political culture and attitudes towards democracy premised on the idea that “Russia is a 
remarkably conservative nation whose mentality and behavior change slowly, if at all, over 
time, regardless of the regime in power” (Pipes 2004; 9). Many scholars who adopt a political 
culture approach to Russian politics stress the country’s distinctive historical traditions and 
political history, including norms related to the mir system, the philosophical concept of 
sobornost' (Biryukov and Sergeyev 1993) and étatisme (Tucker 1992), all of which creates a 
strong sense of path dependence in values and political developments (Hedlund 2005). Many 
studies of Soviet politics have also highlighted “Soviet patriotism” and a general political 
culture in which restrictions on free speech and protest are viewed as normal (e.g., Connor 
1988, 70-75).   
Traditional norms may predispose Russians against dissent and towards maintaining a 
community-based or national consensus on key issues. Analysts working within this approach 
see the tradition of a strong state and central leadership, exercised by a Czar or President - as 
deeply entrenched in Russian political culture. A variety of historical, geographical, military, 
economic and other reasons are seen to have contributed to shaping a political culture that 
attaches little value to democracy and favours strong authoritarian and centralised rule.  
 In relation to the traditional Weberian classification of political legitimacy, this kind 
of regime support is closely related to traditional legitimacy and charismatic legitimacy, at 
least to the extent that this is personified in support for an individual leader. In this sense, 
political legitimacy in authoritarian regimes differs radically from modern legal-rational 
legitimacy (cf. Jowitt 1983) 
Some Western scholars have been sceptical of applying this approach to the study of 
Russia (Colton and McFaul 2002), not least since cultural explanations are often quite 
deterministic and poorly equipped to explain processes of change (Hall 1986, 8-9; Holmes 
2015). However, it should be noted that the political culture approach remains influential in 
Russia (e.g., Biryukov and Sergeyev 1993). 
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If the traditional political culture approach provides an accurate account of Russian 
politics, there should be several observable implications, notably high support for 
authoritarian institutions and low support for democracy. Levels of support should not vary 
greatly over time, as culturally determined preferences and norms are relatively stable. 
The second approach considered in this article relates to a variety of social contract 
theory that has played an important role in empirical scholarship on the Soviet Union and 
contemporary Russia. This should be distinguished from definitions of the social contract in 
much of democratic theory and Western political thought that stress popular approval and 
inputs.2 By contrast, the communist social contract was generally dictated by the state (Cook 
and Dimitrov 2017, 8). Social contract theory became influential in the last decades of 
communist rule when the totalitarian model no longer seemed appropriate. On the one hand, 
the totalitarian model seemed to overstate the intensity of state and party control, which in the 
post-Stalinist period was perceived as less pervasive than before. On the other hand, it 
overstated the passivity, fear and manipulation of the population, not just in the case of 
dissidents, but also in the population at large, where cynicism, questioning and different 
forms of active and passive resistance were possible. As this suggested that significant parts 
of the Russian population tolerated and even accepted at least some aspects of communist 
rule and that this was not just induced by fear, the social contract approach was proposed as 
an alternative framework for understanding communist rule.  For example, Linda Cook's 
influential work identified a “tacit social contract” between the Soviet regime under Brezhnev 
and its working class: “According to the terms of the contract, the regime provided full and 
secure employment, egalitarian wage policies and lax performance pressures in industry, 
state-controlled and heavily subsidised retail prices for essential goods and socialised human 
services (i.e. education, medical care, child care etc.)” (Cook 1992, 37). Cook suggests that 
this contract acted as a severe constraint on the regime, which had to deliver key outcomes or 
“lose legitimacy among workers and risk open discontent”. Stephen White also identifies 
economic performance as the most important legitimation strategy of communist regimes and 
suggests that the trade-off between economic welfare and lack of participation can be 
interpreted as a form of social contract (White 1986, 463). 
Hauslohner (1987) offers a more complex definition of the social contract as a set of 
norms, or “implicit conventions which have been widely accepted by the public and the elite 
as expected and fair rules of the economic game”. Like Cook (1992), Hauslohner (1987, 59–
60) identifies blue collar workers as the main beneficiaries of the Soviet social contract, and 
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he stresses the importance of institutionalisation, notably the centrality of institutions like the 
Labour Ministry, which implemented and defended associated policies over time.  
More recently, scholars have explored the notion of a social contract in post-
communist Russia (Cook and Dimitrov 2017; Greene 2012). For example, Wegren (2003) 
has examined the transformation of the social contract in rural Russia, and Holmes (2001) has 
suggested that there was a social contract between the political and economic elites in the 
1990s that was detrimental to society at large. Cook and Dimitrov (2017) show that social 
welfare provision plays a more limited role in the social contract of post-communist Russia 
than in the Soviet Union.  Others have analysed the applicability of social contract thinking to 
Soviet and post-Soviet workers (Ashwin 1998). There is also an alternative approach to social 
contract theory in Russia based on input legitimacy. Such studies generally conclude that 
there has never been a social contract between Russian rulers and society (e.g. Alexei 
Levinson in Chechel’ and Markov 2015). 
There has also been considerable interest in the social contract in Russia in recent 
years. Dmitry Medvedev referred to the importance of having a social contract in some of his 
speeches as prime minister of Russia (Sakwa 2008, 894). In 2000 the independent NGO 
National Project Institute "Social Contract" was established. It is directed by the Economics 
Professor Alexander Auzan, and this organisation has actively contributed to debates and 
sponsored publications about the social contract and its importance to Russia. Auzan (2009) 
views the social contract as increasingly important and even indispensable in contemporary 
Russia. 
Similarly, Makarkin defines a social contract as a bargain, where the population 
accepts the regime, provided the state is able to “guarantee a reasonable quality of life for the 
majority of the population”. Makarkin (2011, 1467) suggests that such a contract existed for 
much of the Soviet period, when the bargain entailed stability in exchange for loyalty. Auzan 
(2009, 24) states that the social contract “is an exchange of expectations concerning rights 
and freedoms and it is rarely formally expressed. A social contract regulates informal rules at 
a very high level.”3 The Russian scholars' analysis suggests that one of the main problems of 
Russia in the 1990s was the lack of a social contract or any broad-based agreement (e.g. 
Bogayevskaya et al. 2001). Given the unstable economic situation and the first war in 
Chechnya, people remained highly politicised and distrustful of the authorities, hence 
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welcoming direct elections of governors and single-member constituencies as a way of 
manifesting discontent with the authorities (Makarkin 2011). 
Makarkin suggests that the social contract was re-established under Putin when 
people saw that wages and pensions were being paid on a more regular basis and the state as 
capable of restoring “order”. According to Auzan (2009), Russian citizens agreed to a deal 
with the authorities in which they exchange “stability [in the country] for political freedoms”. 
The shock of the economic transition in the 1990s that left most Russians in a tragic 
economic situation and the “low demand for democracy” from citizens (Auzan 2009) 
contributed to the new arrangement of state-society relations after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Economic performance became the sole basis for citizens’ evaluations of the 
authorities due to the hardship caused by the abrupt transition from a centrally planned 
economy to a market-based system and of the continuing shortcomings in establishing 
democratic mechanisms and institutions strengthening social control over the political 
system. In summary, Russian scholars view the social contract - a set of informal rules and an 
exchange of expectations as part of an implicit bargain between society and the authorities - 
as an essential basis for legitimacy and effective modernisation of the country. Its importance 
is underscored by concerns that there may be instability if the authorities are unable to renew 
the social contract under changing circumstances (Auzan 2009). 
Table 1 summarises the two approaches. It should be noted that they have profound 
and divergent implications for our understanding of authoritarian stability in Russia. If the 
political culture approach is correct, we should expect authoritarianism to be quite stable, as 
authoritarian institutions resonate with popular understandings of politics. On the other hand, 
if the social contract view is accurate, then stability is less certain and conditional on the 
authorities delivering their part of the bargain.  
 
--Table 1 around here-- 
 
We show that neither of these perspectives can provide a complete account of the high 
support for the Putin regime. Therefore, this article also develops a third approach, which 
draws on elements of both theories but extends them in important ways. First, this approach 
conceptualises the social contract in dynamic terms.  As noted by Auzan (2009) and 
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Makarkin (2011), the stability of social contracts cannot be taken for granted. Rather than 
viewing it as a stable bargain ensuring both conditional tolerance and regime legitimacy, we 
need to focus on the ways in which social contracts are maintained and renegotiated over 
time and the legitimation strategies the regime uses to accomplish this. If the terms of the 
agreement change over time, then the importance of specific performance indicators to 
assessing output legitimacy can also change. Secondly, we draw on a more nuanced account 
of political culture, which is not merely understood as a structural constraint, but also as a 
resource which political leaders can draw on for political legitimation strategies. Political 
leaders have various tools at their disposal, including strategic agenda-setting, framing of 
policy issues as well as attempts to increase the salience of some issues at the expense of 
others. This relates to Riker’s concept of ‘heresthetics’ as the dynamic manipulation of 
conditions of choice (Riker 1984).  This may include a variety of administrative resources, 
which are likely to be particularly important in authoritarian and hybrid regimes. In addition, 
the degree to which such a legitimation strategy resonates with the public and becomes 
embedded in a social contract or a set of norms specifying popular and elite expectations 
from the regime, may be related to political culture. In the empirical part of this article, we 
argue that the Putin regime has been able to redefine the terms of the Russian contract during 
the economic crisis, by raising the salience of national security and nationalism as key 
performance indicators during the period when oil prices and economic growth fell. This has 
ensured that assessments of the regime remained favourable despite deteriorating economic 
performance, which had been a central plank of the social contract under Putin before 2008 
(Auzan 2009).  
 
Empirical assessment  
Political Culture: Traditionalism and Charismatic Leadership 
Scholars, such as Richard Pipes (2004), have argued that Russians have a strong cultural 
preference for authoritarian rule and that they do not value democracy, which is viewed as a 
weak political system. Other scholars have found that regime support in Russia is based on 
paternalistic ideas, which prevail not only among the rulers but among Russians in general 
(Gudkov et al. 2001, 18). Their study found that Russians tend to hold traditional views about 
the ruler as a father-figure, who “needs to support order in society and secure known 
minimum of consumer goods and social guarantees”. Citizens do not believe they have an 
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active role. Key reasons for this include the rulers’ unwillingness to cede control over society 
and the inability to imagine alternative arrangements (Gudkov et al. 2001).  A possible source 
of legitimacy in such a regime is ideology, which could reflect deeply held values about the 
nature of the state, social justice and their place in the system or guide people towards a 
vision of the future, as in the case of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union (Di Palma 
1991).  However, contemporary Russian elites do not have a coherent ideology of the 
communist kind that could serve as a source of legitimacy. 
 Although Putin is not necessarily inherently charismatic, he enjoys significant 
charismatic authority that contributes to support for the presidency and the regime (Sakwa 
2008: 882, White and McAllister 2008). This helps account for the president’s high approval 
ratings, although the system overall is not perceived as working for the general good of 
citizens. Between 2007 and 2013, more than 50 % of respondents surveyed by Levada Center 
(2013) consistently stated that the interests of government and society did not correspond 
with each other. In 2013, 67 % of respondents said that the government did not act in the 
interests of citizens. Even Putin, the most popular politician in Russia with approval ratings 
over 60% at the time, was believed primarily to represent the interests of siloviki (46%), 
oligarchs (38%), and the state bureaucracy (33%), rather than society at large (14%) (Levada 
Center 2013).  
Yet there are several reasons why such approval ratings cannot be fully explained by 
unconditional support for Putin (charismatic legitimacy) or by some culturally rooted 
preference for authoritarianism (traditional legitimacy). First, there are examples of high 
profile protests which illustrate that tolerance is not unconditional. This includes the election 
protests in 2011-12, the protests to save the Khimki forest in 2010 and the pensioners’ 
protests against the monetisation law in January 2005, which replaced free services (such as 
public transport) with cash payments (Robertson 2011, 176).  New consolidated data on 
protest activity in Russia (Lankina 2015) show that political protests were the most common 
form of protest in 2007-2012. Civic protests (protests about legal, cultural, and environmental 
issues) are the second most frequent type of protests in this period (Lankina 2015, 38).  
Second, the approval ratings of President/Prime Minister Putin fluctuate, ranging between 
61% in November 2013 and 89% in June 2015 (Levada Center 2015a). This indicates that 
people are not entirely uncritical of Putin’s rule and that their assessments change 
considerably over relatively short periods of time. Third, there does not seem to be consistent 
support for authoritarianism among Russians. Numerous studies have demonstrated that 
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many Russians do support democratic rules (Hahn 2005; Colton and McFaul 2002, 
Carnaghan 2007, Mickiewicz 2014).  
Finally, if support for Putin were unconditional, then it is unclear why Putin’s regime 
would seek to undermine fair elections and deny opposition candidates full access to the 
public sphere (White 2011)? This suggests that support for Putin is not necessarily deep or 
unconditional. Some polls indicate that people may support Putin because they do not see any 
viable alternatives (Holmes 2015, 51).  
Social Contract 
It seems clear that Russia does not have a social contract based primarily on input legitimacy, 
as there are limited opportunities for citizens to hold rulers accountable. (e.g. Alexei 
Levinson in Chechel’ and Markov 2015, Gudkov et al. 2001). Most responses to questions in 
the Levada Centre and European Social Values Survey indicate that input legitimacy is low. 
While elections are the main source of input legitimacy in democracies, only 5 % of Russians 
are sure that elections in their country are free and fair and additional 29 % are fairly 
convinced, according to data from the 2012 ESS wave.  On the other hand, 12 % do not 
believe that there are free and fair national elections, while another 29% are rather sceptical. 
The Levada Centre polls before the 2016 parliamentary elections showed that a rather low 
number of respondents were convinced that the elections would be conducted without any 
abuses (20 %), with the rest either having difficulty answering this question (26%) or naming 
different types of electoral abuses (Levada Center 2016). The same poll in May 2016 showed 
that 44 % of respondents believed that the elections would be fair, whereas 38% believed 
they would be ‘dirty’ involving the use of different types of manipulations.  The results were 
further nuanced by Volkov (2016), who showed that the satisfaction with fairness of elections 
is very high mostly among United Russia voters. 
As noted above, this article defines the social contract by drawing on Pakulski's 
concept of conditional tolerance. This implies that support for the leadership and for Putin's 
rule is shaped by current perceptions of performance in terms of generating key outputs. As 
Auzan (2009) and Feklyunina and White (2011) have noted, economic performance in the 
form of high economic growth and rising living standards has arguably been the key output 
underpinning regime legitimacy. This implies that citizens’ attitudes towards the Putin regime 
are positive or at least neutral if the authorities can secure a sense of economic stability 
(Colton and Hale 2009; Treisman 2011). More generally, high levels of support correlate 
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with economic performance: this pattern was observed in the Soviet Union under Brezhnev, 
whose regime delivered stable prices and wages for the working class, but also under Putin, 
who is credited with the economic growth in the 2000s (Treisman 2011; Gudkov et al. 2001, 
44).  
There is some empirical evidence of a social contract based on conditional tolerance. 
For example, a large section of the Russian population is willing to give up some of their 
freedoms if they can expect a “normal salary and reasonable pension” from the state. 
Between 2002 and 2015 around 40 % of Levada Center respondents consistently declared 
that they would agree or rather agree to trade their freedom of speech and freedom to travel 
for these provisions (Levada Center 2015d). This is reminiscent of what Rigby and Fehér 
(1982, 64–81) describe as paternalistic legitimation of communist rule in the post-Stalinist 
era. In this model, citizens traded their individual freedoms for secure jobs without 
competition as well as access to health-care and schooling. These figures are also an 
indication of the priority assigned to material well-being by a substantial part of Russian 
society. Moreover, in their analysis of longitudinal survey data from New Russia Barometer 
between 1992 and 2009, Rose, Mishler and Munro (2011, 101) found that satisfaction with 
the current national economy had the largest and most consistent effect on regime support in 
Russia. Presidential approval had the second largest significant effect, but it depended on the 
evaluation of the economic situation too. According to Volkov (2014), economic conditions 
underpin Putin’s support and the stability of the political system. He emphasises that declines 
in Putin’s popularity coincide with economic crises and that sociological observations of 
Russians since the collapse of the Soviet Union show that the main concerns of the 
population are of an economic nature.  
To the extent that the social contract is based on the idea that the government should 
deliver outcomes perceived to further the common good, it can be seen as related to output 
legitimacy. According to Gilley’s guidelines, we can talk of legitimacy when a citizen 
supports the regime “because it is doing well in creating jobs” and not when a citizen simply 
supports the regimes “because I have a job” (Gilley 2006, 502). If people give priority to 
economic factors, it is very difficult to discern whether they are concerned with their personal 
well-being or with the common good. This difficulty holds also in the case of Russia. If 
regime support is based on an assessment of general performance, we could speak of output 
legitimacy as understood by Gilley. In practice, it is hard to distinguish this empirically from 
instrumental motivations or rule out the possibility that citizens are primarily interested in 
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sustaining their personal welfare, but the fact that increasing support for the Russian political 
regime coincides both with the authoritarian turn and with improvements in most economic 
indicators during the high growth period (2000-2007) compared to the 1990s is consistent 
with conditional tolerance. 
The Global Economic Crisis 
Russia experienced another economic crisis in 2008 in conjunction with the global financial 
crisis. Economic crises can challenge a social contract based on the provision of material 
welfare. An overt form of challenging political authorities is social protest.  Levels of protest 
generally correlate inversely with economic outcomes. This could be observed during the 
Soviet period, including the perestroika period. 
Therefore, the economic crisis is an important test case for the theoretical approaches 
discussed in this article. As noted earlier, it is in effect difficult to make a conclusive 
distinction between them in the period 2000-2007. High levels of support for the Putin 
regime could be explained both with reference to traditional cultural values (Pipes 2004) and 
as a result of conditional support based on high rates of economic growth and rising living 
standards or performance legitimacy (Feklyunina and White 2011). During the economic 
downturn the predictions associated with the two theories are very different. If the political 
culture account is correct, then support for the regime should be unconditional and stable, 
whereas a social contract view would imply that support is conditional and that it would fall 
as a result of deteriorating economic performance. 
The effect of the global economic crisis of 2008 on the Russian economy has been 
profound, because of the structure of the Russian economy and high dependence on oil prices 
(see Table 2; Gaddy and Ickes 2010). In 2014-2015, the Russian economy suffered again due 
to falling oil prices and financial sanctions imposed on Russia. It is difficult to estimate 
independent effects of these financial factors, but available evidence suggests that the impact 
of the sanctions on the GDP and Russian currency was significant, albeit not as great as that 
of the the oil price shock (Dreger et al. 2016). In mid-2014 Russia fell into recession, and this 
downturn affected citizens too. According to official statistics for the first quarter of 2015, the 
number of Russians living below the nationally defined poverty line (minimum subsistence) 
increased by 3.1 million (excluding Crimea and Sevastopol) compared to the same period in 
2014 (Russian Federal State Statistics Service 2015a). Similarly, real average wages 
decreased while the prices of consumer goods increased, especially basic food products like 
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dairy, eggs, fruits and vegetables and fish (Russian Federal State Statistics Service 2015b). 
Rising prices were mentioned as the biggest concern by 82 % of Russians in February 2015 
and by 69 % in February 2017, heading the list of the most pressing issues in Russian society, 
and followed by poverty, increasing unemployment, and economic crisis (Levada Centre 
2017a).   
 
--Table 2 around here---  
 
Despite this downturn there is little evidence of any serious unravelling of support for 
the regime. Studies by Rose, Mishler and Munro (2011, 142–155), McAllister and White 
(2011) and Greene (2012) have shown that despite the economic crisis in 2008-2009, there 
was no noticeable drop in support for the regime. Although Putin’s approval ratings were 
affected by the economic downturn, there was no large increase in protest activities around 
2008 and Putin’s approval ratings never fell much below 60 % (Treisman 2011, 590; Chaisty 
and Whitefield 2012). The fluctuations of trust in Putin over the years (as a president and 
prime-minister of Russia) are presented in Figure 1. 
(Figure 1 here)  
How can we explain the high support despite worsening economic conditions, which 
might be expected to undermine the social contract? We suggest that the continued support 
for the regime can be explained with the third approach – a dynamic account of the social 
contract, which implies that the contract can be broadened or reshaped by de-emphasising 
one type of output (delivery of material well-being) and emphasising another (protection of 
the national values). By adopting a legitimation strategy stressing nationalist ideas, 
understood as both protection of traditional Russian values and defending Russia from 
enemies, especially in the context of the annexation of Crimea, the regime has reduced the 
salience of economic issues.  
According to data from various Russian public opinion centres, after 2010, 
satisfaction with the direction in which the country is developing is connected with 
assessments of leadership and largely disconnected from economic well-being (Greene 2012, 
136–137). For example, in 2010 respondents viewed increasing salaries and benefits as the 
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biggest achievement of Putin’s rule (43 %), while in March 2014, most people (51 %) stated 
that the biggest success of Putin’s rule was retrieving the great power status of Russia in the 
world. At the same time, Putin was evaluated as least successful at securing a just distribution 
of incomes and returning resources to ordinary people (35 and 31 % respectively in 2014). 
One fourth of the respondents thought that Putin had not succeeded in overcoming the 
economic crisis, strengthening law and order and raising salaries. He was also considered as 
completely or partially responsible for Russia’s problems by 82 % of respondents (Levada 
Center 2014b). Despite this criticism, Putin’s approval rating hardly dropped below 60 %, 
and his reputation as a charismatic leader is skilfully sustained by the media (White and 
Mcallister 2008).  
So far, satisfaction with the regime has remained high (Levada Center 2015a). 
Similarly, even the protests of 2011 and 2012 were largely disconnected from economic 
issues as they were a reaction to fraudulent elections to the State Duma in 2011 and Putin’s 
return to the presidency (Robertson 2013). Despite the expectation that the 2011/2012 wave 
of protest signalled an increase in civic engagement in Russia, on average there was no 
significant increase in the number of people who participated in public demonstrations 
(European Social Survey (ESS) 2015; waves 2006 and 2012).   
During this period there have been systematic attempts to stress nationalism as a 
legitimation strategy. In terms of policy, this includes patriotic mobilisation surrounding 
mega-events like the Sochi Olympics (Persson and Petersson 2014). Most importantly, such 
mobilisation has also related to the annexation of Crimea, which has featured prominently 
both in political and also social media discourses (Suslov 2014) – often captured by the 
exhortation ‘Krym nash’ (Crimea is ours). More generally, in an influential speech to the 
Federation Council shortly after his election in 2012, President Putin stressed the importance 
of dukhovnye skrepy (spiritual staples/bonds) (Putin 2012). This is a good example of 
attempts to conjure up a moralisation of politics and more intense pride in being Russian and 
associated duties (Sharafutdinova 2017). Thanks in part to positive media coverage of the 
annexation of Crimea, Putin’s approval ratings reached 86% at the end of June 2014, 
approaching the peak of 88% achieved during the 2008 Georgian War (Asmolov, Levinson, 
and Prokhorova 2014). This pronounced patriotic mobilisation and the widespread conviction 
that Russia is surrounded by enemies, with the US as the most important one (Levada Center 
2015d) has been associated with a marked improvement in the perception of the direction in 
which Russia is heading, which was boosted by 20 % in June 2014 compared to the level 
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from January 2014. This legitimation strategy and its resonance with the population at large 
seem consistent with key features of the political culture approach, notably the strength of 
nationalism as well as a sense of vulnerability in the face of international pressures, like 
economic sanctions (Pipes 2004; Tsygankov 2016).  
These changes in legitimation strategies have led to some change in the bases of 
support for Putin. While it is often said that Russia lacks a coherent ideology justifying the 
regime, the typical Putin voter during his first two presidential terms tended to be more 
economically liberal and less nationalistic than the average voter (Colton and Hale 2009), but 
at the onset of his third presidency, Putin stressed nationalism and conservatism as the core 
values that unite Russians (Laruelle 2013). Such appeals can be viewed as attempts to 
reinforce traditional legitimacy. If nationalism and conservativism are perceived to be 
overarching goals, then having a strong presidency safeguarding these ideals may be viewed 
as more important than procedural principles and input legitimacy. Over the last few years, 
the Russian regime has been trying to enhance legitimacy by emphasizing the role of 
tradition, religion and history and by protecting the common values of Russian society 
(Torbakov 2014). The governmental plan to introduce a programme on patriotic education 
and upbringing has met with considerable enthusiasm from the majority of citizens (68 % 
were in favour of such a programme, while 49% expressed unqualified support for it; Levada 
Center 2015c). To the extent that such values are viewed as paramount and the government as 
an effective guardian of them, this enhances the perceived legitimacy of the government and 
weakens demands for popular participation and pluralism in politics. 
It should also be noted that the Russian regime introduced various restrictions on 
public organisations and protests in the aftermath of the colour revolutions (Finkel and 
Brudny 2012). Limiting pluralism in the sphere of political activism was justified by Putin as 
safeguarding the national interest from foreign encroachment and formalised with various 
regulations, including the ‘foreign agent’ law. Moreover, loyal and nationalist alternative 
organisations were created within which youth was mobilised to support the regime and 
promote patriotism (Horvath 2011, Petrone 2011). These restrictions may have contributed to 
the lack of increase in public engagement such as protests, membership in political parties, or 
contacting politicians between 2006 and 2012. Another factor explaining the lack of serious 
challenges to the regime is the fact that a vast majority (around 80 %) do not believe that they 
can influence politics in any way (Levada Center 2015b; “New Russia Barometer 2009” 
2015). However, public opinion surveys show that Russians are not particularly preoccupied 
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with the lack of freedoms in their country as 59% of respondents in 2012 thought that people 
in Russia have enough freedom and 18% believed that Russians enjoy too much of it (Levada 
Center 2012). Even if they had the means to do so, they would not like to participate in 
political or civic activism (Gudkov 2015, Mickiewicz 2014). 
The patriotic and tradition-oriented ideas promoted by the elites seem to resonate with 
most Russians. Russians tend to separate their lack of approval for the government’s actions 
from the support and pride of their country (Levada Center 2014a). This can partially explain 
the rise in Putin's popularity whenever he took actions that were presented as defending the 
abstract national interest of Russia. The wish to recover Russia’s lost glory as a great power 
on the international stage unites Russians in their support for the interventions in Ukraine in 
2014 and Georgia in 2008 (Gudkov 2014). Moreover, the consolidation of Russia’s 
international position had become an increasingly important determinant of Putin’s approval 
by 2014 (Hutcheson & Petersson 2016, 1120). In addition, Russians feel great pride in Russia 
because of its history, armed forces and culture, and much less because of its economic 
success (Levada Center 2017b). This suggests that political culture has provided a repertoire 
of symbols and ideas that has served as an effective legitimation strategy for the Putin 
regime. 
In conclusion, while there is some evidence to suggest that regime approval fell after 
the economic crisis, support quickly rebounded and even increased. The volatility of approval 
suggests that support is not unconditional. We argue that support has been maintained by 
renegotiating the social contract and by increasing the salience of nationalism as a key 
performance indicator for assessing output legitimacy in Russia. 
 
Conclusions: Stability, Social Contract, and Legitimation Strategies  
This article has discussed political culture and social contract theory and shown that these 
theories cannot fully account for Russian regime stability. Many traditional political culture 
explanations overstate the stability of support for the Putin regime. On the other hand, while 
economic performance generally correlates with support for the regime, the lack of 
substantial social upheaval during the economic crisis suggests that there are other important 
bases for the stability of the regime. We suggest that this outcome can be explained through 
the lens of a dynamic social contract – where previously assessments of the economic 
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situation mattered most, this contract was transformed by increasing the salience of 
nationalism. This implies that the authorities can reshape the terms of the contract and 
broaden it, by making alternative 'outputs' more salient in people's assessment of the regime. 
This involves making more extensive use of legitimation strategies that draw on nationalism 
and ideas that resonate with traditional political culture. This suggests that the social contract 
between the political authorities and Russian citizens incorporates other dimensions and that 
it could no longer be sustained purely on the grounds of economic performance. This is also 
underpinned by Putin’s leadership, which capitalises on nationalist sentiments of Russian 
citizens. The convincing narrative of Putin’s rule, initially in terms of economic 
modernisation and strengthening of the state (Sakwa 2008) and more recently as a guardian 
of the national interest, so far compensates for negative evaluations of virtually all state 
institutions and for actual economic problems. There are three broader implications of this 
analysis. 
First, this article relates to the growing literature investigating how political 
authorities use various legitimation strategies to convince citizens that they are rightly in 
position of power (e.g., Holbig & Gilley, 2010; Mazepus et al., 2016; Von Soest & 
Grauvogel, 2016). We have shown how political culture and social contract theory are bound 
up with different notions of legitimacy and how these theories could be integrated within one 
framework. Although these theories have generally developed independently of one another, 
this article suggests that legitimacy, social contract theory and political culture can be 
fruitfully combined.  
Second, this suggests the potential for bridging rationalist and political culture-based 
accounts of comparative politics. Greater attention to cultural variables could address an 
important shortcoming of rationalist approaches, namely the lack of attention to processes of 
preference formation (Hall 2005). Legitimation strategies are not always successful. To the 
extent that elite strategies have contributed to a reformulation of the social contract in Russia 
and laid the foundation for stable support for the regime, our argument implies that the 
resonance of the adopted legitimation strategies with political culture may be an important 
reason for their success. This would imply that there is some potential for reshaping social 
contracts, but that such contracts are not infinitely malleable. Successful legitimation 
strategies that reshape perceived legitimacy and contribute to a stable social contract are 
likely to be those that are well aligned with prevailing cultural scripts and social preferences. 
Other comparative studies analysing the use of different legitimation strategies could shed 
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light on the degree to which the success of such strategies varies across cultural contexts. 
Moreover, they could investigate to what extent nationalism (authorities’ emphasis on 
security of their people and safeguarding particular values of their nation from destructive 
international factors) is a common element of the existing social contracts in non-
democracies and how it contributes to their stability.4  
Finally, while our analysis suggests that social contracts underpinning regime stability 
can be adjusted to reflect changing circumstances, the long-term prospects of the Russian 
social contract remain uncertain. It is easy to overstate the degree of authoritarian stability 
and not clear whether the support for the regime can be sustained if the economic problems 
that Russia has been experiencing due in part to the lower oil prices and counter-sanctions 
imposed on the West seriously affect the well-being of citizens. The lack of upheaval could 
suggest that the consequences of the economic crisis were until now not sufficiently severe to 
bring about greater resistance. If the economic situation were to deteriorate further, then it is 
not clear whether alternative legitimation strategies would work.  A comparison with the 
Middle East may also be instructive here. Many scholars have used the idea of a social 
contract to explain state-society relations in the Middle East (e.g., Losman 2010) and 
suggested that especially natural resource abundant countries offer a favourable bargain to 
their populations, by which they distribute resource rents in exchange for regime support. As 
the Arab Spring illustrates, this does not necessarily guarantee the stability of 
authoritarianism. On the other hand, some regimes in the most resource-abundant countries in 
the Middle East have been quite robust, which might indicate that economic performance 
related to oil and gas prices could continue to have an important effect on Russian regime 
developments as well. As shown by Gerschewski (2013), the stability of authoritarian and 
hybrid regimes tends to depend on three pillars – co-optation, repression and legitimacy. In 
practice, economic performance will have an important impact on output legitimacy and the 
regime’s ability to co-opt strategic groups. It remains to be seen whether appeals to 
nationalism will provide a sufficiently strong foundation for regime stability and constitute a 
durable social contract in the longer term if robust economic growth does not resume. 
1 We refer to the ‘Putin regime’ given the centrality of Putin to the functioning of the political 
system in Russia. As demonstrated by various data sources, the popularity of Putin and his 
regime is not highly correlated with support for various formal institutions in the Russian 





                                                                                                                                                                                    
2. Many influential thinkers in the history of Western political thought, from Hobbes, Locke 
and Rousseau to John Rawls and various contemporary theorists, have viewed the social 
contract as an essential part of their theories of politics (Waldron 1994, Rosenfeld 1984, 
Rawls 1971). While there are interesting parallels between Russian approaches and social 
contract tradition in Western thought, we do not consider these questions here (but see 
Shlapentokh 2003).   
3. It should be noted that this social contract does not necessarily presuppose democracy in 
Russian writings, at least not as conventionally defined in the West (Makarkin 2011, 1470). 
Makarkin suggests that Russians tend to view democracy as a system benefiting the people in 
socio-economic terms (hence, according to Makarkin, they view both Russia and Belarus as 
more democratic than an economically struggling albeit politically more open Ukraine).    
4 There are some affinities between classical Hobbesian accounts of the social contract ‘as a 
means of creating a power capable of holding war at bay’ (Forsyth 1994, 42) and the logic of 





Ashwin, Sarah. 1998. “Endless Patience: Explaining Soviet and Post-Soviet Social Stability.” 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31 (2): 187–98.  
Asmolov, Aleksandr, Alexey Levinson, and Irina Prokhorova. 2014. “Ploskaya Strana [A Flat 
Country].” Novoye Vremya/The New Times, June 16. 
http://www.newtimes.ru/articles/detail/83515. 
Auzan, Alexader. 2009. “Dynamics of Social Contract.” Russia in Global Affairs, no. 2. 
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_13026. 
Biryukov, Nikolai, and Victor Sergeyev. 1993. "Parliamentarianism and sobornost': two 
models of representative institutions in Russian political culture." Discourse & Society 
4 (1): 57-74. 
Bogayevskaya, O. V., G. V. Kalyagin, I. Y. Kobrinskaya, P. V. Kryuchkova, O. V. 
Makarenko, and I. E. Shul’ga. 2001. Novyj Obshchestvennyj Dogovor: Povestka Dnya 
[New Social Contract: Agenda], edited by O. V. Makarenko and G. V. Kalyagina. 
Moscow: Institute of National Project “Social Contract.” 
Brown, Archie, ed. 1985. Political Culture and Communist Studies, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Carnaghan, Ellen. 2007. "Do Russians dislike democracy?." PS: Political Science and 
Politics 40 (1): 61-66. 
Chaisty, Paul, and Stephen Whitefield. 2012. “The Effects of the Global Financial Crisis on 
Russian Political Attitudes.” Post-Soviet Affairs 28 (2): 187–208. 
Chechel’, Irina, and Aleksandr Markov. 2015. “‘Alexey Levinson: Obshchestvennogo 
Kontrakta v Rossii Ne Sushchestvuyet’ [Alexei Levinson: The Social Contract in 
Russia Does Not Exist].” Mikhail Gefter. http://gefter.ru/archive/15289. 
Colton, Timothy J., and Henry E. Hale. 2009. “The Putin Vote: Presidential Electorates in a 
Hybrid Regime.” Slavic Review 68 (3): 473–503.  
Colton, Timothy J., and Michael McFaul. 2002. "Are Russians Undemocratic?." Post-Soviet 
Affairs 18 (2): 91-121. 
Connor, Walter D. 1988. Socialism's Dilemmas: State and Society in the Soviet Bloc. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Cook, Linda J. 1992. “Brezhnev’s ‘social Contract’ and Gorbachev’s Reforms.” Soviet 
Studies 44 (1): 37–56.  
Cook, Linda J. and Martin Dimitrov. 2017. “The Social Contract Revisited: Evidence from 
Communist and State Capitalist Economies.” Europe-Asia Studies 69 (1): 8-26. 
Di Palma, Giuseppe. 1991. “Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society.” World Politics 44 
(1): 49–79. 
Dreger, Christian, Konstantin A. Kholodilin, Dirk Ulbricht, and Jarko Fidrmuc. 2016. 
“Between the hammer and the anvil: The impact of economic sanctions and oil prices 
on Russia’s ruble.” Journal of Comparative Economics 44 (2): 295-308. 
Eckstein, Harry. 1988. “A Culturalist Theory of Political Change.” American Political 
Science Review 82 (3): 789-804. 
22 
 
European Social Survey (ESS). 2015. “European Social Survey (ESS).” Accessed August 7. 
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/. 
Feklyunina, Valentina, and Stephen White. 2011. "Discourses of ‘Krizis’: Economic Crisis in 
Russia and Regime Legitimacy." Journal of Communist Studies and Transition 
Politics 27 (3-4): 385-406. 
Finkel, Evgeny, and Yitzhak M. Brudny. 2012. “Russia and the Colour Revolutions.” 
Democratization 19 (1): 15–36.  
Forsyth, Murray. 1994. “Hobbes’s Contractarianism: A Comparative Approach”, in Boucher, 
David and Kelly, Paul (eds). The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls. London: 
Routledge. 
 Frye, Timothy, Scott Gehlbach, Kyle L. Marquardt, and Ora John Reuter. 2016. “Is Putin’s 
popularity real?.” Post-Soviet Affairs, doi: 10.1080/1060586X.2016.1144334. 
Gaddy, Clifford G., and Barry W. Ickes. 2010. "Russia after the global financial crisis." 
Eurasian Geography and Economics 51(3): 281-311. 
Gerschewski, Johannes. 2013. "The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-
optation in autocratic regimes." Democratization 20 (1): 13-38.  
Gilley, Bruce. 2006. “The Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 
Countries.” European Journal of Political Research 45 (3): 499–525.  
Greene, Samuel A. 2012. “Citizenship and the Social Contract in Post-Soviet Russia.” 
Demokratizatsiya 20 (2): 133–40. 
Gudkov, Lev. 2014. Rossiya, kotoruju vybirayet bol’shinstvo, -kakaya ona? [Russia chosen 
by majority- how does it look like?] Interview by V. Dymarskij and K. Larina. Ekho 
Moskvy. http://www.levada.ru/21-06-2014/rossiya-kotoruyu-vybiraet-bolshinstvo-
kakaya-ona. 
Gudkov, Lev. 2015. “Pochemu v 2017 Godu v Rossii Ne Budet Revolutsii [Why There Will 
Be No Revolution in Russia in 2017].” Moskovskij Komsomolets. 
http://www.mk.ru/politics/2015/08/06/pochemu-v-2017-godu-v-rossii-ne-budet-
revolyucii.html. 
Gudkov, Lev, B. Dubin, N. Zorkaya, O. Bocharova, Alexey Levinson, and A. Lerner. 2001. 
Obshestvennyj Dogovor, Sotsiologicheskoje Issledovanije [Social Contact. 
Sociological Research], edited by D. Dragunskij. Moscow: Institute for the National 
Project “Social contract.” 
Hahn, Jeffrey W. 2005. “Yaroslavl’ Revisited: Assessing Continuity and Change in Russian 
Political Culture Since 1990”. In Political Culture and Post-Communism, edited by 
Stephen Whitefield, 148-179. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hall, Peter A. 1986. Governing the Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hall, Peter A. 2005. “Preference Formation as a Political Process: The Case of Monetary 
Union in Europe.” In Preferences and Situations: Points of Intersection Between 
Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism, edited by Ira Katznelson, and Barry 
R. Weingast. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Hauslohner, Peter. 1987. “Gorbachev’s Social Contract.” Soviet Economy 3 (1): 54–89. 




Holbig, Heike, and Bruce Gilley. 2010. “Reclaiming Legitimacy in China.” Politics & Policy 
38 (3): 395–422.  
Holmes, Stephen. 2001. “What Russia Teaches Us Now: How Weak States Threaten 
Freedom.” American Prospect 33: 30-39. 
Holmes, Stephen. 2015. “Imitating Democracy, Feigning Capacity”, in Democracy in 
Russian Mirror, edited by Adam Przeworski.. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Horvath, Robert. 2011."Putin's ‘preventive counter-revolution’: Post-Soviet authoritarianism 
and the spectre of Velvet revolution." Europe-Asia Studies 63(1): 1-25. 
Hutcheson, Derek S. and Bo Petersson. 2016. “Shortcut to Legitimacy: Popularity in Putin’s 
Russia.” Europe-Asia Studies 68 (7): 1107-1126. 
Jowitt, Ken. 1983. “Neotraditionalism: The Political Corruption of a Leninist Regime.” 
Soviet Studies 35 (3): 275-297. 
Kryshtanovskaya, Olga, and Stephen White. 2005. “The Sovietization of Russian Politics", 
Post-Soviet Affairs 25 (4): 283 
Lankina, Tomila. 2015. “The dynamics of regional and national contentious politics in 
Russia: Evidence from a new dataset.” Problems of Post-Communism, 62(1): 26-44. 
Laruelle, Marlene. 2013. “Conservatism as the Kremlin’s New Toolkit: An Ideology at the 
Lowest Cost.” In Putin’s Turn to Traditionalism/nationalism, 138:2–4. Russian 
Analytical Digest. http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv/eth:7640/eth-7640-
01.pdf?pid=eth:7640&dsID=eth-7640-01.pdf. 
Levada Center. 2012. “Russians about Democracy, Rights, and Freedoms.” 
http://www.levada.ru/10-08-2012/rossiyane-o-demokratii-pravakh-i-svobodakh. 
Levada Center. 2013. “Interests of Authorities and Interests of Society in the Perception of 
Russians.” http://www.levada.ru/28-01-2014/interesy-vlasti-i-obshchestva-v-
predstavleniyakh-rossiyan. 
Levada Center. 2014a. “Perceptions of Their Country by Citizens of Russia [Vosprinyatiye 
Rossiyanami Svoyej Strany].” http://www.levada.ru/2014/11/18/vospriyatie-
rossiyanami-svoej-strany/. 
Levada Center. 2014 b. “Vladimir Putin: Successes and Failures, strength” [Vladimir Putin: 
Udachi i neudachi, sila]. http://www.levada.ru/2014/09/09/vladimir-putin-udachi-i-
neudachi-sila/. 
Levada Center. 2015a. “Indexes.” https://www.levada.ru/indikatory/odobrenie-organov-
vlasti/ 
Levada Center. 2015b. “Cooperation between Citizens and the State.” 
http://www.levada.ru/2015/04/06/vzaimodejstvie-grazhdan-i-gosudarstva/. 
Levada Center. 2015c. “Patriotism i Gosudarstvo [Patriotism and the State].” 
http://www.levada.ru/29-04-2015/patriotizm-i-gosudarstvo. 
Levada Center. 2015d. “Ugroza Dlya Rossii so Storony SShA [Danger to Russia from the 
USA).” http://www.levada.ru/12-05-2015/ugroza-dlya-rossii-so-storony-ssha. 
Levada Center. 2015e. “Protest Potential and Opinion about the Authorities.”  
https://www.levada.ru/2015/07/07/protestnyj-potentsial-i-vospriyatie-vlasti/. 




Levada Center. 2017a. “Most pressing issues”. https://www.levada.ru/2017/03/07/samye-
ostrye-problemy/. 
Levada Center, 2017b. “National pride.” https://www.levada.ru/en/2017/05/29/national-pride/ 
Losman, Donald L. 2010. "The Rentier State And National Oil Companies: An Economic 
And Political Perspective." Middle East Journal 64 (3): 427-445.:  
Makarkin, Aleksei. 2011. “The Russian Social Contract and Regime Legitimacy.” 
International Affairs 87 (6): 1459–74.  
Mazepus, H., Veenendaal, W., McCarthy-Jones, A., & Trak Vásquez, J. M. (2016). A 
comparative study of legitimation strategies in hybrid regimes. Policy Studies, 37(4), 
350–369.  
McAllister, Ian, and Stephen White. 2011. “Public Perceptions of Electoral Fairness in 
Russia.” Europe-Asia Studies 63 (4): 663–83. doi: 10.1080/09668136.2011.566429. 
Mickiewicz, Ellen. 2014. No Illusions: The voices of Russia's future leaders. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
“New Russia Barometer 2009.” 2015. Accessed August 5. 
http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/catalog1_0.html. 
Pakulski, Jan.1986. "Legitimacy and Mass Compliance: Reflections on Max Weber and 
Soviet-type Societies." British Journal of Political Science 16 (1): 35-56. 
Persson, Emil, & Bo Petersson. 2014. “Political mythmaking and the 2014 Winter Olympics 
in Sochi: Olympism and the Russian great power myth.” East European Politics 
30(2): 192-209. 
Petrone, Laura. 2011. "Institutionalizing pluralism in Russia: A new authoritarianism?." 
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 27(2): 166-194. 
Pipes, Richard. 2004. "Flight from Freedom-What Russians Think and Want." Foreign 
Affairs 83: 9-15. 
Putin, Vladimir V. 2012. “Poslanie Prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniyu”, 12 December, 
available at http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17118 
Pye, Lucian W. 1968. "Political Culture," in International Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences, Vol. 12, edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free Press. 
Rawls, John. 1971. “A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press) 
Rigby, Thomas Henry, and Ferenc Fehér. 1982. Political Legitimation in Communist States. 
St. Martin’s Press. 
Riker, William H. 1984. “The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, 
with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice.” American Political Science 
Review 78 (1): 1-16. 
Robertson, Graeme B. 2013. “Protesting Putinism: The Election Protests of 2011-2012 in 
Broader Perspective.” Problems of Post-Communism 60 (2): 11-23. 
Robertson, Graeme B. 2011. The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes: Managing Dissent in 
Post-Communist Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rosenfeld, Michel. 1984. “Contract and Justice: The Relation between Classical Contract 
Law and Social Contract Theory.” Iowa Law Review 70: 769. 
Rose, Richard, William Mishler, and Neil Munro. 2011. Popular Support for an 




Rothschild, Joseph. 1977. “Observations on Political Legitimacy in Contemporary Europe.” 
Political Science Quarterly 92 (3): 487–501. 
Russian Federal State Statistics Service. 2015a. “On the Relation of Income and Subsistance 
Minimum and the Total Number of the Poor People in the Russian Federation in the 
1st Quarter of 2015.” 
http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b04_03/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d05/111.htm, accessed 
16/06/2015. 
Russian Federal State Statistics Service. 2015b. “Short-Term Economic Indicators of the 
Russian Federation.” http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b16_02/Main.htm. 
Sakwa, Richard. 2008. “Putin's Leadership: Character and Consequences.” Europe-Asia 
Studies 60 (6): 879-897. 
Saxonberg, Steven. 2013. Transitions and Non-Transitions from Communism: Regime 
Survival in China, Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam. Cambridge University Press. 
Schedler, Andreas. 2002. "The menu of manipulation." Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 36-50. 
Sharafutdinova, Gulnaz. 2017. “Managing National Ressentiment: Morality Politics in 
Putin’s Russia” in Vocabularies of International Relations after the Crisis in Ukraine; 
edited by Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk, London: Palgrave  
Shlapentokh, Vladimir E. 2003. "Hobbes and Locke at odds in Putin's Russia" Europe-Asia 
Studies 55 (7): 981-1007. 
Sil, Rudra and Chen, Cheng. 2004. "State Legitimacy and the (In)significance of Democracy 
in Post-Communist Russia." Europe-Asia Studies 56 (3): 347-368. 
Suslov, Mikhail. 2014. “’Crimea Is Ours!’ Russian popular geopolitics in the new media age” 
Eurasian Geography and Economics, 55 (6): 588-609. 
Swidler, Ann. 1986. "Culture in action: Symbols and strategies." American Sociological 
Review: 273-286. 
Torbakov, Igor. 2014. “The Russian Orthodox Church and Contestations over History in 
Contemporary Russia.” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet 
Democratization 22 (1): 145–70. 
Treisman, Daniel. 2011. “Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin 
and Putin.” American Journal of Political Science 55 (3): 590–609. 
Tsygankov, A. 2016. “Crafting the State-Civilization Vladimir Putin’s Turn to Distinct 
Values”, Problems of Post-Communism 63(3): 146–158. 
Tucker, Robert C. 1992. "Sovietology and Russian history." Post-Soviet Affairs 8 (3): 175-
196. 
Verba, Sidney. 1965. "Comparative Political Culture." In Political Culture and Political 
Development, edited by Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.  
Volkov, Denis. 2014. “What Is the Link between Economics and Putin’s Popularity?” Russia 
Beyond The Headlines. 
http://rbth.co.uk/opinion/2014/06/09/what_is_the_link_between_economics_and_puti
ns_popularity_37321.html. 




Von Soest, Christian, and Julia Grauvogel. 2016. "Comparing Legitimation Strategies in 
Post-Soviet Countries." In Politics and Legitimacy in Post-Soviet Eurasia, edited by 
Martin Brusis, Joachim Ahrens, and Martin Schulze Wessel, 18-46. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Waldron, Jeremy. 1994. “John Locke: social contract versus political anthropology", in 
Boucher, David and Kelly, Paul (eds). The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls. 
London: Routledge. 
Wegren, Stephen K. 2003. “The Rise, Fall, and Transformation of the Rural Social Contract 
in Russia.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (1): 1–27. 
Wilson, Richard W. 2000. “Review: The Many Voices of Political Culture: Assessing 
Different Approaches.” World Politics 52 (2): 246-273.  
White, Stephen. 1986. “Economic Performance and Communist Legitimacy.” World Politics 
38 (3): 462-482. 
White, Stephen. 2011. “Elections Russian-Style.” Europe-Asia Studies 63 (4): 531-556. 
White, Stephen, and Ian Mcallister. 2008. “The Putin Phenomenon.” Journal of Communist 
Studies and Transition Politics 24 (4): 604–28. 
Whitefield, Stephen, and Geoffrey Evans. 1999. “Political Culture versus Rational Choice: 
Explaining Responses to Transition in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.” British 
Journal of Political Science 29 (1): 29-154.  





Table 1: Comparing the two theoretical approaches 
 Political culture Social contract 










High level of 
unconditional support 
for strong presidency 




high perceived output 
legitimacy reduces 
demand for political 
participation and 





Table 2. Main economic indicators (unless stated otherwise, the data comes from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service* 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Real-money income (% of 
the previous year) 
113 110 111 115 113 112 114 113 104 102 105 101 106 105 100 95 
Consumer prices (% of the 
previous year) 
120 119 115 112 112 111 109 112 113 109 109 106 107 107 111 113 
Minimal food basket cost 
in Dec (% in of December 
of the previous year) 
113 119 113 108 113 111 109 122 118 101 123 94 108 110 115 108 
Real average monthly wage 
(% of the previous year) 
121 
 
120 116 111 111 113 113 117 112 97 105 103 108 105 101 91 
People living under the 
poverty line (% of 
population) 
29 27.5 24.6 20.3 17.6 17.8 15.2 13.3 13.5 13 12.5 12.7 10.7 10.8 11.2 14.1 
(Jan-
Sept)  
Real awarded pensions (% 
of the previous year) 
128 121 116 105 106 110 105 105 118 111 135 101 105 103 101 96 
GINI coefficient*** 37.1 39.6 37.3 40.8 40.9 41.4 41.5 42.3 41.4 39.7 40.9 41.0 41.6 - - - 
* Source: Russian Federal State Statistics Service available at http://www.gks.ru 
** Note from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service: Cost of conventional (minimum) foodstuff basket reflects inter-regional level 
disparity of consumer prices of the relevant food stuffs. Unified conventional volumes of consumption of food stuffs, determined across the 
Russian Federation, and average consumer prices of them in constituent entities of the Russian Federation are used for calculation of the cost. 




Figure 1. Percentage of respondents expressing trust and distrust in Putin over the years.
 
Source: Levada Centre, https://www.levada.ru/2017/04/24/15835/ 
Note: Distrust is a sum of ‘Fully distrust’ and ‘Rather distrust’ responses; Trust is a sum of  ‘Fully trust’ and ‘Rather distrust’. ‘Don’t know’ answers were not included in the 
graph. 
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